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CHAPTER 15 
Allies Down Under? 
The Austrolion at War 
and the "Big lie" 
Martin Hirst and Robert SchUtze 
In the United States, Rupert Murdoch's Fox cable television network led 
the charge for patriotic journalism during the 2003 Gulf War. 
Murdoch does not own a television station in Australia, but he does control 
two-thirds of the metropolitan daily newspaper market and over 75% of the 
lucrative Sunday market (ABC, 2000). With the two most popular 
papers-Melbourne's Herald Sun and Sydney's Daily Telegraph-and the only 
nationally circulating daily newspaper-the Australian-in his stable, Murdoch 
is without doubt the "Prince of Press" in Australia. Therefore, understanding how 
Murdoch's antipodean media empire tackled the war in Iraq is central to 
understanding how the conflict was framed for the Australian public. 
This chapter takes a look at how his flagship masthead-the 
Australian-covered Iraq in the context of terrorism and the invasion hysteria 
surrounding asylum-seekers landing on Australian shores. 
MURDOCH COMMITTED TO COALITION 
From the start, the Australian was firmly committed to the coalition of the 
willing and the "war on terror," providing a well-orchestrated cheer squad for 
Prime Minister John Howard and the invasion ofIraq. This was obvious from the 
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tone and content of both its editorials (Australian, 2002, October 12) and "straight 
news" pieces. 
On one level this is not surprising given the global nature of Murdoch's $42 
billion News Corporation empire and the likely economic benefits to big business 
from the Iraq war. Yet economic self-interest must be ruled out if we are to hold 
Murdoch to the public service rhetoric that marked the beginning of his rise to 
media power. 
In 1961, shortly after acquiring his first Sydney newspaper, he said: "What 
rights have we to speak in the public interest when, too often, we are motivated 
by personal gain?" (Mayer, 1968, p. 51). Forty years later, the dichotomy between 
public and private interests somehow collapsed as Murdoch's Australian chief 
executive, Ken Cowley, told parliament: 
We take the view, as simple as it is and as corny as it sounds, that what is good for 
your country is good for your business and what is good for your business is good 
for your paper, its readers and our employees. (cited in Schultz, 1998, p. 102) 
This argument underpins the "national interest" frame that the Murdoch 
press places over almost everything it does. Editorial writers have become 
particularly adept in framing economic liberalism, deregulation, privatization, 
tight budgets, and the user-pays principle as being not only good for the nation as 
a whole, but good for individual citizens. 
So, perhaps there was more than just economic self-interest underpinning 
the Australian's support for the Iraq war. Certainly the rhetoric employed by the 
paper invoked nationalist discourses that exploited the threat of global terrorism 
and historical fears of invasion to sell one of the most unpopular public policies 
in Australian history: the commitment of Australian troops to war. 
TERRORISM, FEAR, AND THE POST-COLD WAR NEWS FRAME 
Since September 11,2001, the national interest frame has been subsumed 
by the new terrorism frame in the mainstream media. 
~ l" In its moral simplicity, the terrorism frame is reminiscent of the old "Cold 
War news frame," which dramatized superpower rivalries and pitted East against 
West, capitalism against communism (Giffard, 2000, p. 389).i'Within the terror 
frame, bomb-wielding Islamic fundamentalists have replaced the "Reds under the 
bed" as the West's public enemy No.1. While geography is not so clear-there 
is no Iron Curtain-the dichotomies are equally stark, as Christopher Kremmer 
(2002) noted: 
Media reporting on the war on terror is riddled with the simplistic notion that this 
is a battle between innately good, wise, Western, liberal, democratic paragons and 
dark-skinned, bearded, fanatical, evil-doers. 
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In this post-Cold War terrorism news frame, the battle lines are drawn 
between good and evil, us and them, with a jingoistic reassertion of nationalist 
pride. The Australian's hawkish foreign editor embodied this perfectly in his 
response to the October 2002 Bali bombings: 
Just as we love Australia, the evil men who murdered our people and others in Bali, 
they surely hate Australia. And why do they hate us? They hate us not for our 
wickedness, which is occasional and undeniable. They hate us for our oddly 
persistent goodness. (Sheridan, 2002, October 17) 
Murdoch's flagship newspaper might have taken the terror frame too far in 
early 2003 when it reported on a spate of bush fires in the eastern states under the 
banner, "Summer Terror." But otherwise, the selective articulation of facts and 
skewed perspectives that characterize writing within the terror news frame goes 
largely undetected. Yet the effect is palpable. 
Passing off official versions of reality as common sense helps to sell "the 
big lie." In this case, "the big lie" is the notion that there is a war on terror that can 
be fought and won by invading Iraq. 
"THE BIG LIE" 
The notion that the war on terror can be fought and won by invading Iraq, 
a constant theme in the Murdoch press, has helped naturalize a piece of official 
spin and an otherwise problematic concept: that there is a tangible conflict which 
needs to be resolved (or at least approached) militarily. 
The Australian began uncritically using this concept of waging war against 
an unspecified enemy soon after the terror attacks in the United States and has 
been feting Australia's need to fight in it ever since. Essentially it supported Prime 
Minister Howard's justification for sending troops into Afghanistan because 
everyone is susceptible to terrorism and what happens in the rest of the world 
affects "us." As the Australian's own media columnist, Errol Simper (2002) notes: 
"The media has, more or less, tended to let the politicians run with the terrorism 
story." 
But the Australian media, and the Murdoch press in particular, was pedaling 
fear long before the January 2003 "summer of terror." Ironically for a nation 
founded by European invasion just over two hundred years ago, invasion anxiety 
has been a strong and recurring theme in white Australian history. The notion of 
an amorphous external threat goes back to the influx of Chinese workers during 
the 19th century gold rushes, and later spawned the White Australia policy. 
As Simon Philpott notes (2001, p. 376), fear of an imagined "Other," which 
for Australia has traditionally been Asia, helps galvanize political unity by 
locating threats to the national well-being beyond our borders. Fear of "being 
swamped by Asians" turned fish-and-chips shop owner Pauline Hanson into a 
runaway political success late in the 1990s and, more recently, the 
176 Global Media Go to War 
institutionalized fear of invasion has manifested as hysteria over refugees ("boat 
people," as they are referred to in the mainstream press) a level of public 
insecurity that Ghassan Hage calls "paranoid nationalism" (2003, p. 1). 
BALI: AUSTRALIA'S SEPTEMBER 11 ? 
Public terrorism fears were dramatically realized when two huge explosions 
ripped through Bali's tourist haven of Kuta in October 2002. The Australian's 
first headline screamed, "TERROR HITS HOME," and the phrase stuck as the 
banner heading for all subsequent coverage. 
Framing the bombings as an attack on Australia provided the key emotional 
link to September 11 and seemed to justify Australia's role in the "war on terror." 
As Errol Simper (2002) pointed out, amidst the grief and outrage that ran through 
the Bali coverage, there was an element of wish-fulfillment: 
To deny that segments of Australia appeared to crave at least a share of the 
adrenaline and global media attention that accompanied September 11 is to deny the 
nose on your face. 
This was being played out, at least subconsciously, as Australia's September 
11. As Labor's then leader Simon Crean told Parliament, "I think we get 
something of a better understanding as to what Americans must have felt on 
September 11" (Shanahan, 2002, October 18). 
The link was also borne out in the rash conclusion from Day One that the 
Bali bombings were an attack on Australians, just as September 11 was an attack 
on Americans. As the Australian 'sforeign editor Greg Sheridan proclaimed on the 
first day of coverage, "There can be little doubt that Australians were specifically 
targeted." (Sheridan, 2002, October 14). 
The conclusion is both hasty and vain. It highlights the perverse cultural 
imperialism that has transformed a part ofIndonesia into an Australian territory. 
Perverse because Australia has persistently denied its geography and nurtured 
cultural links to Europe and North America rather than Asia. As the latest 
government White Paper on foreign affairs and trade states, "Australia is a 
Western country located in the Asia-Pacific region with close ties and affinities 
with North America and Europe" (Advancing the National Interest, 2003, p. 8). 
Asia, particularly Indonesia, has been the imagined "Other" in true Orientalist 
fashion. So to call this small part of Indonesia our "home away from home,"as 
Murdoch's national daily did in its first editorial after the bombing (Australian, 
2002, October 14), is a paradox. 
When the nationalist discourses in Murdoch's Australian are examined, the 
framing of Bali as an attack on Australia is hardly surprising. That many of the 
Australian victims were football players celebrating the end of the season was 
especially painful to a nation where "sport is the most universal of activities" 
(Fraser, 1971, p. 241 ). Old national character stereotypes of mateship, larrikinism, 
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working-class perseverance, and sporting prowess pervaded the coverage, helping 
to frame the bombing as an attack on Australian values. Eulogies of the victims 
were perfect examples: 
He was a quintessential working-class boy. He loved his footy, his mates and 
betting on horses. But most of all, Adam Howard, a 27-year-old professional punter 
from Double Bay in Sydney, loved to party. (Bryden-Brown, 2002) 
But from the barrage of emotive journalism sprang a more serious and 
sinister message in the Australian-that this was war and that a decisive campaign 
was called for. Greg Sheridan proclaimed, "The terrorist empire has struck back" 
(Sheridan, 2002, October 14), and said the "war on terror" had moved decisively 
into Stage Two. 
A fIrst-day editorial said Bali was a "wake-up call" to the civilized world 
that terrorism must be defeated. In language all but transcribed from a Bush or 
Howard speech, the Murdoch paper proclaimed, "Bali proves that all freedom-
loving peoples are at risk from terrorism, at home and abroad" (Australian, 2002, 
October 14). This was a decisive moment for the saber-rattlers. Howard's central 
premise justifying action in Afghanistan and later Iraq was endorsed-namely, 
that terrorism affected everyone, so it was in the national interest to fIght terrorism 
throughout the world, Iraq included. 
The Australian roundly quashed the anti-war arguments that saw Bali as a 
payback for Australia's support for America in Afghanistan. But when Greens 
leader Bob Brown was pressed for his opinion on Iraq in light of the Bali 
bombing, his anti-war position was labeled "opportunistic" by political editor 
Dennis Shanahan (2002a, October 14) and sparked a wave of angry letters. The 
Australian's bias was unmistakable the following day, when Shanahan (2002b, 
October 15) reserved judgment in reporting John Anderson's pro-war blather in 
light of the Bali attacks. 
Instances of the newspaper's overt support for the "war on terror" and 
particularly for invading Iraq after the Bali episode are too numerous to list. 
Certainly, with the foreign editor (Sheridan, 2002, October 14) andeditor-at-Iarge 
(Kelly, 2002, October 19-20) talking up Australian involvement in Iraq, the pro-
war lobby got a huge free kick. 
But on a more insidious level, the Australian helped sell Howard's war by 
re-inventing him as a sensitive, trustworthy statesman in the aftermath of the Kuta 
attacks. In pictures, the usually wooden prime minister was shown hugging 
distraught mourners; in headlines he was given the heart to "weep" (Martin, 
2002); and in stories he validated the nation's anger by saying, "We'll get the 
bastards" (Kelly, 2002, October 26-27). As Paul Kelly notes, "having divided the 
nation so bitterly for so much of his prime ministership, Howard is now a fIgure 
of unity. It is bizarre"(ibid). 
Helped by the Murdoch press, Howard scored a major political boost after 
the Bali bombings-his approval rating soared seven points to 61 % a week after 
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the attacks (Shanahan, 2002, October 22). Even though intelligence reports and 
arguments for invading Iraq didn't add up, Howard's popularity and "track 
record" on security insulated him from an anti-war backlash. Even the vitriol of 
Bali victims and their families was muted when Howard explicitly linked his pro-
war stance to the Bali bombings during a visit to New Zealand. 
The anti-war Canberra Times led its March 11 edition with the backlash 
story, proclaiming, "Outrage at Bali linkage" (Peake, 2003). In stark contrast, 
Murdoch's paper picked up a wire story and tucked the embarrassing episode 
away on Page 5 (AAP, 2003). What this shows is that on both the op-ed and the 
news pages, the Australian manipulated the Bali bombings to plead the case for 
war in Iraq. Meanwhile, up to 75% of Australians opposed the war before the start 
of combat operations (Shanahan, 2003, August 5). 
ALLIES UNDER PRESSURE 
Despite its overt support for the war, there were plenty of divergent views 
in the Australian. This created the appearance of balance and objectivity, which 
underscores the values of a liberal-pluralist "fourth estate" defense of the media. 
Just a week before combat began, the Australian was reporting the frantic 
attempts by President Bush and Prime Minister Blair to pull something out of the 
public relations disaster that was occurring in the UN. Blair was described as 
"bleeding politically" while the White House was claiming that any vote by the 
Security Council to support war would be a "moral victory," with or without a 
veto from China, Russia, or France. 
A report from USA Today that the United States was threatening to withhold 
aid to recalcitrant Latin American nations unless they supported the war was 
buried in the last of sixteen paragraphs (Lusetich, 2003a). Prime Minister 
Howard's 20-minute phone conversation with George Bush was the second lead 
on March 13, 2003, saying Australian diplomats were "frantically lobbying" at the 
UN on the coalition's behalf (Shanahan, 2003, March 13). This story was 
reinforced by a UN "scorecard" on Page 8, outlining how former European 
colonies were being pressured for their crucial Security Council votes (Sutherland 
2003a). 
The Australian also reported the remarkable and dramatic resignation of 
Andrew Wilkie, a senior officer with spy agency the Office of National 
Assessments (ONA) a week before the fighting started. Wilkie cited his 
disagreements with ONA over their threat assessment of Iraq. He appeared all 
over the media for a couple of days and spoke at an anti-war rally in Canberra. 
Despite official attempts to discredit him, Wilkie stuck to his guns and denounced 
the government's decision to join the war: 
I have been following the flow of intelligence very closely and, as far as I am 
concerned, I have seen nothing that justifies a war against them (quoted in 
McIlveen, 2003a). 
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Yet despite the appearance of these divergent views on the news pages, the 
leader pages apparently "set the record straight" and put Murdoch's pro-war 
position in a loyal and succinct kind of way. The editorial, "French toast irrelevant 
UN" (Australian, 2003, March 13), makes it clear that the Australian regarded 
Chirac as a faded power living an "impossible dream" and whose arguments at the 
UN were "less weak than feeble." France, the editorial warned, could be accused 
of reducing "global politics to a competition between great powers in which a 
nationalist France cannot compete." 
As usual, the Australian's chorus of support for the Australian government 
was led by the very conservative and pro-Howard foreign editor Greg Sheridan. 
On March 13, 2003, Sheridan resolutely defended the morality of the war in the 
face of an ''unreasonable veto" by one of the non-pennanent Security Council 
members (Sheridan, 2003, March 13). Sheridan described the debate as 
"emotional and irrational," "hysterical," and then he restated all the well-
rehearsed lines defending the morality of an attack on Iraq. Sheridan went on to 
cheer the psychological operations of the Americans, in particular "Shock and 
Awe," which he described as a "dislocation operation directed at the Iraqi 
leadership" (Sheridan, 2003, March 22-23). 
To be fair, Sheridan's support for the war was tempered by two other 
opinion pieces on March 22. Washington-based commentator Harlan Ullman 
argued that U.S. unilateralism might have profound implications for the world 
geopolitical situation well into the future (Ullman, 2003). On the same page, 
Professor Paul Dibb (2003), a respected Australian commentator on defense 
issues, suggested that a likely outcome of the war was "a world divided and a 
return to the essentially tragic history of international affairs." 
AN AUSTRALIAN INTEREST? 
Australian public opinion is sensitive to perceptions that its government 
might be accused of being a junior partner in America's imperial ambition. This 
has deep historic and cultural roots in Australia's colonial past and post-war 
reliance on America. There is still a memory of Australia's participation in 
Vietnam, summed up by the famous phrase of an otherwise forgettable Prime 
Minister, Harold Holt. During President Lyndon Johnson's Australian visit in 
1966, Holt told the U.S. leader that Australia would go "all the way with LBJ." 
Holt's political successor, John Howard, did not want to be seen in this 
unflattering light. It was therefore important that his government establish an 
independent rationale for supporting GWB 's war against Iraq. Rather than merely 
being America's "loyal deputy," there needed to be some "national interest" in 
going to war. 
The trump card was terrorism. Particularly in the aftermath of the Bali 
bombing, the successful argument was that terrorism could touch anyone, so 
threats to national security were global and required global solutions. This was 
reflected in the government's foreign policy white paper, released in early 2003: 
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The terrorist attacks ... in the United States and ... Bali have been defining events. 
They have changed Australia's security environment in significant ways. They 
starkly demonstrated that threats to Australia's security can be global as well as 
regional. (Advancing the National Interest, 2003, p. 9) 
The A ustralian firmly embraced this sentiment and linked the all-pervasive 
threat of terrorism after Bali to Saddam Hussein's fabled weapons of mass 
destruction: 
Gruesome as these terrorist outrages are, imagine what they would be like if they 
involved weapons of mass destruction. Iraq remains the most likely source of 
WMDs for al-Qaeda. (Sheridan, 2002, October 14) 
National affairs editor Mike Steketee bolstered the Australian's pro-war 
stance by trying to dismiss the "loyal deputy" label on the first weekend of war: 
Don't accept for one moment the propaganda that Australia is a lickspittle of the 
United States. Sometimes we get quite upset with the Americans. (Steketee, 2003) 
The "propaganda" Steketee referred to here was the false argument that the 
anti-war movement was "anti-American" and believed that John Howard was 
merely following Washington's line. By highlighting Australia's mildly critical 
comments at the time of America's refusal to join international efforts to enforce 
an international ban on biological weapons in 2001, Steketee suggested that 
Australia was truly independent and by implication that support for the war 
against Iraq was good policy. 
FIRST STRIKE: SHOCK & AWE 
In the first few days of the war there was plenty of patriotic footage and 
novelty stuff from the front of tanks. 
The Weekend Australian (March 22) blared "PUNCH INTO IRAQ" over 
front-page stories about the military action (Eccleston, 2003) and published an 
opinion poll showing "support for war growing" (Shanahan, 2003, March 22-23). 
The key element of the Australian's front page was the carefully staged 
photograph of an Iraqi soldier being given water while an assault rifle is aimed at 
his head and his hands are bound. This image was also on the front page of the 
Sydney Morning Herald the same day (Saturday March 22). While the Australian 
media's appetite for the "our troops in action" type of stories was satisfied by an 
easing of restrictions, the main game was still the coalition's confidence and 
apparent lack of resistance by Iraqi forces. 
On the second day of coverage, the Weekend Australian reported American 
concerns that Iraqis would begin setting fire to oil wells, sparking "Fears of a new 
scorched earth" (Browne, 2003). It was another opportunity to quote from the 
briefing by Donald Rurnsfeld, this time to the effect that by setting fire to oil wells 
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Saddam Hussein was "destroying the riches of the Iraqi people" (quoted in 
Browne, 2003). On the same page, Hussein is labeled a "master of propaganda" 
(Kerin, 2003, March 22-23), and a White House briefing paper, "Apparatus of 
Lies," is summarized without criticism. 
This piece repeats the standard line from Washington: that Hussein is 
responsible for diverting food aid into "weapons programs and luxuries for 
himself' and lying to the Arab world. Throughout the military campaign, the 
Australian repeated these justifications almost daily. 
It is worth noting here how commercial television in Australia approached 
the war. Immediately after the fighting actually got under way (as opposed to 
twelve years of bombing raids on soft Iraqi targets), broadcast network news 
presenters set a poor tone for the coverage that followed. On the first Saturday 
(March 22), some news anchors were smiling and almost cheering "our first 
strike" on Iraqi targets-a bombing mission by an Australian FA 18 and some 
ship-to-shore fire at the AI-Faw peninsula. 
The Nine Network, which is owned by Australia's second richest man, 
Kerry Packer, framed its coverage with a graphic rendering of the words "War on 
Iraq" that showed an uncanny resemblance to the title screen of George Lucas' 
science fiction classic, "Star Wars." Perhaps unwittingly, Greg Sheridan struck a 
similar chord when, after the Bali bombings, he wrote in the Australian: "The 
terrorist empire has struck back" (Sheridan, 2002, October 14). Episode Five in 
the Lucas epic is called "The Empire Strikes Back," a fitting allegory for the "war 
on terror." 
OPERATION MUSHROOM: WE CAN FINALLY TELL You ABOUT IT 
On that first weekend, the Australian Broadcasting Corporation's (ABC) 
correspondent in Qatar, Peter Lloyd, unwittingly let the cat out of the bag about 
media control: the coalition forces were also conducting "Operation Mushroom" 
against the media. 
In a frank exchange with Insiders host Barry Cassidy, Lloyd told of his 
frustration and that of the hundreds of reporters at the alliance military command 
center in Qatar (ABC 2003, March 23). They were not getting any information, 
the briefmgs were sporadic, and most of the stuff they were sending out in hourly 
"crosses" had actually been fed to them via fax, email, and Internet links from 
their home bases. 
Early in the conflict, Australian reporters complained about the lack of 
information from their own national military sources. The Australian's staffer in 
Qatar, Rory Callinan complained in print about being "cocooned from reality by 
the coalition's public relations machine" (Australian, 2003, March 22-23). 
Callinan said he was "locked into the multimillion-dollar press center ," he called 
"press conference central." Callinan said the press corps is unhappy: "Weare a 
bit like mushrooms here, being drip-fed information." 
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The appearance of this brief piece signaled the emergence of a new genre 
of war stories: news and commentary on the media's broader role. Further 
attention was drawn to the media's role by Ashleigh Wilson's story about war 
coverage and comment on the Internet, "Conflict comes to a PC near you" 
(Wilson, 2003). 
Complaints from Qatar and Canberra about the dearth of Australian 
information was not the harbinger of nascent anti-war sentiment among news 
reporters. It was really a plea for more color and background material to fill out 
the coverage and encourage a sense of Australian public ownership of the conflict. 
This was key to making the case for war in terms of the "national interest." 
Without a local angle, Iraq looked like someone else's war. Therefore, from very 
early on there was coverage of what Australian forces were doing, including 
frigates "in hunt for fleeing cronies" (Kerin, 2003, March 22-23). 
To the media's relief, the Australian military PR operation allowed reporters 
to visit ships on search missions and mine clearing in the Gulf in the second week. 
And one ABC news crew was embedded with Marines as they entered Baghdad. 
On the other side, Australian journalists operating behind Iraqi lines were 
confined to Baghdad and some were expelled. Ian McPhedran and other News 
Limited reporters were confined to a Baghdad hotel. McPhedran was also briefly 
accused of spying for the allies. 
"Operation Mushroom" was not only going on close to the war-zone. On the 
home front too, the fog of war descended quickly on that first weekend. For many 
Australians watching the war unfold on television, it seemed like they were being 
carpet-bombed with expert opinion. Most commentators were pro-war, and very 
few anti-war or pro-peace voices were seen or heard. 
PEACENIKS AND DEVIANTS: COVERING THE ANTI-WAR RALLIES 
After the massive international rallies in February and March 2003, public 
sentiment in Australia was overwhelmingly against the war with up to 75% 
opposing it (Shanahan, 2003, August 5). 
The anti-war marches were the biggest Australian mobilizations since 
Vietnam. Some estimate they were the largest political demonstrations ever in 
Australia-more people on the streets over a sustained period than during the anti-
conscription mobilizations of W orId War I, and certainly bigger than the 
moratorium. 
The marchers were a cross-section of ordinary Australians from every ethnic 
and religious background. There was a sense of purpose and strength in the 
crowds and sentiment way to the left of the official Labor opposition. In Brisbane, 
then Labor leader Simon Crean was booed when he addressed the crowd of about 
80,000. His right-wing position of support for a "legitimate" UN-backed attack 
on Iraq was very unpopular. 
High school students were mobilizing in impressive numbers in all major 
cities. Spontaneous walkouts, some supported by parents and the teachers' unions, 
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saw several large student actions. Church groups, green, and peace groups worked 
with the various left groups and the unions to build the anti-war rallies. 
As the war got closer the news media's attitude to the peace movement 
changed. The NSW police signaled a tough stand against student demonstrations 
and warned parents not to let their children get involved with anarchists and 
violent young men of a certain ethnic background (i.e., Arab-Australians). This 
policing action also sent a strong signal to the media that the gloves were off and 
the peace movement was no longer a "good" news story. 
There is a formula for covering political demonstrations and if there is no 
strong violence-usually from the police-then it does not rate much of a 
mention. This approach was typified by a small piece in the Murdoch-owned 
Courier-Mail in Brisbane about an anti-war rally in Adelaide on March 14. The 
story, headlined "Eggs, tomatoes fly in Adelaide protest" (Courier-Mail, 2003), 
was only eight paragraphs and the "missiles" are mentioned in four of them: 
1st par: 
2nd par: 
3rd par: 
4th par: 
5th par: 
6th par: 
7th par: 
8th par: 
"demonstrators threw eggs and tomatoes at Howard's car"; 
"one protester was taken into custody after charging at a 
Commonwealth vehicle containing Mr. Howard"; 
"Earlier protesters pelted Mr. Howard's car with eggs and tomatoes"; 
"One egg hit the rear window ofthe vehicle containing Mr. Howard"; 
"Demonstrators chanting anti-war slogans and carrying placards were 
kept about fifteen meters from Mr. Howard by South Australian 
police"; 
"despite the police barrier, protesters pelted three Commonwealth 
vehicles with eggs and tomatoes"; 
"The protesters then left [the scene]"; 
"When he left, one protester broke police ranks, charged at the vehicle 
containing Mr. Howard, and appeared to throw something. No charge 
was laid." 
Apart from one mention of "anti-war slogans," this item did not say 
anything about the nature of the rally or the ideas behind it. Instead we got 
pointless repetition of two basic incidents: the "eggs and tomatoes" thrown at the 
car and one person running at "the vehicle containing Mr. Howard." This is a 
typical "news" report of the anti-war protests. The "deviant' nature ofthe smaller 
actions, such as confronting John Howard in Adelaide, is then applied to the 
movement as a whole. 
This effect was also multiplied by the television coverage of the 
demonstrations. On the main television bulletins on the first Saturday of the war 
(March 22), the peace rallies held around the nation and globally got short shrift. 
At most, in a 90-minute bulletin the peace activists got a couple of short vox-pops. 
But they were bracketed with the violence of some protest actions in the Middle 
East. In Brisbane, the Channel 7 reporter sounded disappointed that there had 
been "scuffles, but no arrests" at that morning's rally and sit-in. 
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On the other commercial stations the same thing happened. The local peace 
rallies were always covered by long-distance camera, a few anonymous shots of 
the crowds, a couple of colorful banners perhaps and, on a slow news day, a grab 
from one of the speakers. The rallies overseas were most often covered with a 
reader voice-over that gave bare facts and where possible focused the shots on 
"disturbances." 
Overall, the anti-war movement was reduced to inarticulate thuggery. 
Perhaps it is testament to the power of this and other elements of the pro-war 
coverage that by April, Australia's 75% opposition to the war had turned to 57% 
support (Shanahan, 2003, August 5). 
SOME JOURNALISTS OPPOSE THE WAR 
It would be unfair to characterize the Australian news media as solidly pro-
war. Some, like Canberra Times editor-in-chief Jack Waterford, made their 
opposition clear, as did Sydney Morning Herald online political editor, Margo 
Kingston. Others took a similar stand and some held to a diminishing middle 
ground of critical distance and vague support for something to be done about 
Saddam Hussein. 
Australian columnist Matt Price (2003) typified this latter position: 
Millions of Australians are despairing at this war. We want it to end quickly, even 
if this elevates Howard to short-term heroism and makes his slavish media cheer 
squad even more unbearable than usual. 
Lies, propaganda, and deliberate misinformation should be expected in war. 
As British journalist and author Phillip Knightley (1989) says, the use of public 
information as a weapon of war is an honored tactic of presidents and generals. 
Only rarely do working journalists, particularly senior ones, acknowledge this 
openly; though many will say so quietly at dinner parties or in the bar after hours. 
One rare editor in this category is Jack Waterford of the Canberra Times. 
He wrote a leader on April 5, 2003, detailing the countless lies we were told by 
"our own" side. He noted how Western journalists had been lied to about some 
events-the outcome of battles, the numbers ofPOWs, how civilian deaths had 
occurred at checkpoints. Waterford pointed out the deceptions in the Jessica 
Lynch incident, but pessimistically added that, in propaganda terms, when the 
truth fmally emerged some time later, it didn't really matter: 
Surely the fact that the truth will usually emerge, often only in a day or so, might 
make some soldiers and politicians less willing to lie? Not necessarily, it would 
seem, if it serves some immediate purpose. (Waterford, 2003) 
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A direct propaganda hit on the news media won on the day in the Private 
Lynch affair and by the next day there was a new outrage, atrocity, or allied 
victory to take its place. 
The Australian news media shared the pleasure of the allied victory in Iraq 
and carried most of the same packaged material seen everywhere-the toppling 
of the statue, the waving and smiling crowds, and the seeming celebration of 
Saddam's overthrow. 
However, it was interesting to note how quickly this soured and how quickly 
we began to see cracks appearing in the coalition rhetoric. 
CONCLUSIONS 
It is not surprising Rupert Murdoch's Australian led the patriotic media 
brigades in Australia during the 2003 Gulf War. On the other side of the ledger, 
the Sydney Morning Herald and the Canberra Times both editorialized against 
Australian involvement in the anti-Saddam coalition. Cutting through what the 
popular press took to calling the "fog of war" was very difficult. As in the 1991 
Gulf War, the American military controlled not only the air above Iraq but the 
airwaves as well. 
The Doha briefing from the stage at press conference central produced more 
enhanced images of smart bombs, trucks exploding under bridges, and cruise 
missiles launched dramatically from the safety of the U.S. fleet. But television 
viewers saw much more intensive footage of the fighting and this impacted the 
language of the war, such as the Australian television news readers who excitedly 
reported that "our" fighters had had a "productive" day in the battlefield, or the 
one who smiled when announcing the RAAF had dropped its first bomb-like it 
was a birth or something to celebrate (ABC TV 2003, March 23). 
The embedded media also showed us some horrible stuff: dead and 
wounded prisoners of war, bombed homes, a firestorm over Baghdad, and 
civilians dying in hospitals. British journalist John Simpson and his party were 
strafed by U.S. warplanes. His Iraqi translator was killed and viewers saw human 
blood dripping on the camera lens as it was carried by a wounded journalist. 
We saw three civilians in Baghdad shot as their car tried to overtake an 
army truck in which an ABC crew was embedded. One ofthe few left-wing voices 
heard in the Murdoch press, Phillip Adams, described the barrage of gore as 
"pornographic violence" (Adams, 2003). Everything, it seems, was more bloody 
and extreme in the 2003 Gulf War. 
In the new language of this war, extreme violence was commonplace. It 
shocked us momentarily, but then the relentless, more subtle language of war took 
over: "friendly fire," "smart bombs," "unfortunate" civilian deaths, the callous 
disregard for basic human rights and outright lies. It is easy to get angry about 
these obvious linguistic tricks of war; not so easy to decipher the more embedded 
language. 
186 Global Media Go to War 
In the Australian, this amounted to a more purposeful, yet less obvious form 
of propaganda, known as "the big lie." It was the ideological appeal to 
nationalism, patriotism, and the myth of free markets and democracy. It is a lie 
because what it offered-so-called "Western liberal democracy" as the solution 
for Iraq and as the moral force behind the "war on terror"-was itself a deception. 
The Australian and other Murdoch papers churned and spun this lie for all 
it was worth. They used it to link the Bali bombings with the invasion of Iraq by 
raising the specter of Armageddon: "Gruesome as these terrorist outrages are, 
imagine what they would be like if they involved weapons of mass destruction" 
(Sheridan, 2002, October 14). Then the spurious link between Iraq and terrorism 
is passed off as common sense: 
This week John Anderson told the Australian parliament what we all really know 
but try not to face, that there is a connection between terrorism and rogue nations 
with weapons of mass destruction. (Sheridan, 2002, October 14) 
The alternative is never mentioned and so the lie appears to be the only 
possible version of the truth. This is an ideological swindle. 
In the scramble to make sense out of complex and rapidly moving world 
events, journalists and editors fall back on simplistic generalizations and 
stereotypes. During the Iraq war, the "enemy" was demonized and opponents 
made deviant in terms of the "common sense" approach. This helped legitimize 
the use of force. 
In the case ofthe military enemy-Iraq-SaddamHussein's followers were 
constantly referred to as the Fedayeen. They were "thugs," they were vicious and 
criminal. This approach from the opinion writers and columnists justified the 
attacks and the killing, even though, according to these same apologists, any death 
in war is "regrettable." 
At home, the effect was similar. Peace activists were derided as the "loony-
left," the "peaceniks," or worse, manipulating communist cells operating 
clandestinely. Young working class students and teenagers from Sydney's 
southwest, angry about the war and clearly against it, were stereotyped as "hot 
heads," thugs, and ''un-Australian.'' Their Arab-ness, not their Australian identity 
was what the pro-war press emphasized. In both cases-the Iraqi regime and 
Australian protesters-the media tended to fall back onto racist stereotypes, 
creating moral binaries. 
This is exactly what the post-Cold War terrorism news frame is 
about-reducing complex geopolitical and cultural issues to simple questions of 
right and wrong, us and them. Within this frame, the 2003 Gulf War and the so-
called "war on terror" are represented as battles between good and evil. George 
W. Bush talks about "freedom-loving people" and "evil men" and the Murdoch 
press regurgitates it in editorials as if this moral dichotomy was a natural category 
(Australian, 2002, October 14). This essentializes the "terrorist problem" in the 
same way that biological essentialism is used to justify sexism. 
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If the terrorists are defmed as innately evil, then there is no need to look at 
how policies and practices in the Western world might contribute to the conflict, 
because innately "evil men" are beyond redemption. It's nature. Fighting the "war 
on terror" then becomes a matter of rounding up the evil men more than anything 
else. 
In Australia, the agenda-setting Murdoch press employs this terror news 
frame and it sells newspapers. It sells because the frame is easy to understand. 
And it sells because it appeals to a sense of patriotic nationalism and an endemic 
insecurity based on the historical fear of invasion. In a multicultural country 
struggling to define its post-colonial identity, the moral certitude of the "war on 
terror" has obvious mainstream appeal, even if it somehow does not answer all the 
lingering questions. 
During hostilities, support for war increased in the United States, United 
Kingdom, and Australia, which was to be expected in part because the news 
media popularized the war and dulled people's senses to the violence they 
portrayed. No doubt the Murdoch press played an important role in cohering what 
support there was for Australia's involvement in 2003 Gulf War. 
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